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PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE GOUGING: THE
NEED FOR DIRECT REGULATION ON THE
GRAY MARKET
NICOLE RENDE†
I.   INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are walking home after a long, tiring day at work—
your feet dragging, your body aching. Just that morning, you went
to the pharmacy and picked up your pill to treat a disease you have
been fighting for quite some time. This disease is the result of a
weakened immune system from yet another life-threatening
disease you have. That one, single, small pill costs what one
month’s worth of groceries would cost for your family of four. Both
you and your spouse work low income jobs, living paycheck to
paycheck. Exhausted, you walk into your small apartment and
see no one is home yet. You foolishly open the fridge just to see
that it contains nothing.
You sit on the couch and turn on CNBC where you witness a
CEO of one of these drug companies being questioned by Congress.
You had no idea why the price of your pill went from just thirteen
dollars to around seven hundred dollars.1 You quickly realize that
the CEO is being questioned on the reasoning behind his increase
in the price of the one small pill you took that morning. The tiny
pill that you need to save your life. You stare blankly at the
television as the CEO continuously repeats with a smirk, ”On
advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your

†J.D. 2018, St. John’s University School of Law.
1 See The Young Turks, Price Gouging Drug CEO Claims He’s The Good Guy, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVIgveDesEY; CNBC, Turing CEO
Martin Shkreli Talks 5,000% Drug Price Hike (Full Interview), YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-U1MMa0SHw (explaining that the CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals abruptly raised the price as a business decision without considering any
consequences to patient health).
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question,” to every single simple question he is asked.2 You sit
there watching, as your hope for answers dwindles and all you are
left with are more questions . . . why is he doing this, how can this
happen, why does it happen . . . but all you can do is sit there,
without any answers to explain your empty fridge. Defeated.
Hopeless.
There are other victims of pharmaceutical price gouging. Price
gouging in the medical industry has become an increasing problem
for the working poor and the middle class in the United States.3
Price gouging is a problem for the working poor because medicine
that was once affordable for this group of people is no longer
affordable.4 More importantly, patients of failing to terminal
health are unable to afford life-saving medications. These drugs
did not increase in price by accident. The price of life-saving drugs
was increased because of the underlying problem of price gouging
by pharmaceutical companies.
Price gouging “refers to the practice of raising the prices of
goods, services, or commodities” to a level much higher than is
reasonably fair, exploiting certain groups of people that cannot
afford the goods so much so that it becomes unethical.5 Price
gouging has become an issue in the pharmaceutical market.
Pharmaceutical companies have recently been acquiring each
other,6 making the market for medical supplies and medication a
market of limited options.
There are fewer companies,
manufacturers, and suppliers of life-saving drugs,7 which creates
2 CNBC, Martin Shkreli Testifies Before Congress: Full Testimony, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPIQ_gyiHag.
3 See Sreedhar Potarazu, Rising cost of prescription drugs threatens health care gains,
CNN (Aug. 26, 2015, 7:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/26/opinions/potarazu-drugprice-hikes/; Who are the working poor in America?, UC DAVIS CENTER FOR POVERTY
RESEARCH, http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/who-are-working-poor-america (last visited Feb.
23, 2017) (“The ‘working poor’ are people who spend 27 weeks or more in a year in the labor
force either working or looking for work but whose incomes fall below the poverty level. . .
In 2014, the working poor as a fraction of all people in the labor force for 27 weeks or more
were: 11.7% Black, 11.7% Hispanic/Latino, 5.5% White, 4.3% Asian[,] 7.2% women, 5.5%
men[,] 18.3% with less than a high school diploma[,] 8.3% high school graduates with no
college education[, and] 2% with a bachelor’s degree or higher.”).
4 See Potarazu, supra note 3.
5 Price Gouging, LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://legaldictionary.net/price-gouging/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2017).
6 Makarand Jawadekar, Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharma Industry, ELSEVIER
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://pharma.elsevier.com/pharma-rd/mergers-acquisitions-pharmaindustry/.
7 See id.
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an environment ripe for monopoly.8 Due to lack of competition,
some entities completely control the supply of a life-saving drug so
that price gouging can easily occur.9 In addition to the decrease in
the number of medical suppliers, the drug quantities themselves
are in shortage.10 The demand for the life-saving drugs is
increasing while the supply of the drugs is decreasing. Unethical
officers of pharmaceutical companies are taking advantage of this
situation by buying the small supply of highly important lifesaving drugs at the expense of patients in an indirect, unregulated
way: the gray market.11
The gray market is an “unofficial, unauthorized, and unintended
distribution network through which secondary wholesalers buy
and sell medications at inflated prices.”12 The normal distribution
network is manufacturer to distributor to dispenser chain,
whereas gray market entities negatively influence this network by
buying and reselling drugs countless times before eventually
selling the drugs to the dispensing entity.13 The gray market,
originating as a network through which individuals and
companies could buy and sell counterfeit, substandard, and
ineffective medications, became “an avenue for opportunists to
profit from the national drug shortage crisis.”14 Pharmaceutical
companies that participate in the gray market are raising prices
of life-saving drugs to extremely high rates because of the lack of
adequate federal regulation on medication prices.
Although there has been some state and federal legislation
regulating the pharmaceutical market generally, there is still too
much leeway for companies to get around these regulations
8 A monopoly is a business term for when there is an “exclusive ownership through legal
privilege, command of supply, or concerted action.” Monopoly, WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monopoly (last visited Feb. 24, 2017).
9 See Sean Williams, These 3 Pharmaceutical Companies Control Roughly Half of All
Cancer Drug Sales, THE MOTLEY FOOL
(Jan.
25,
2015,
8:03
AM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/01/25/these-3-pharmaceutical-companiescontrol-roughly-h.aspx.
10 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING
DRUG SHORTAGES (2013) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN].
11 See Short-Supply Prescription Drugs: Shining A Light on the Gray Market: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 112th Cong. 9 (2012) [hereinafter ShortSupply Prescription Drugs].
12 Brittany Mahugh, Lost in the Gray: Navigating the Problem of Pharmaceuticals in
the Gray Market, 25 A.B.A. HEALTH. L. 1, 1 (2013).
13 See id.
14 Id. at 3.
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because they affect the gray market only indirectly.15 There is no
legislation directed at the gray market itself, and the indirect
regulations on the gray market are not a means of effective
enforcement on the gray market.16
The underlying issue of price gouging in the medical industry
has multiple parts that are currently not being entirely addressed.
The relationship between the national drug crisis, the
pharmaceutical gray market, and the pharmaceutical price
gouging practices generates a domino effect of causally linked
sequences of occurrences with price gouging being the final piece
of the domino linkage chain. The national drug crisis is at the
beginning of the domino linkage chain with price gouging of
pharmaceuticals at the end. The gray market is a major piece in
the middle of this chain allowing the drug prices to increase
without any regulation. Regulating the gray market would put a
gaping hole in the domino sequence and make price gouging less
likely.
This Note proposes federal legislation that will ultimately shut
down the Pharmaceuticals gray market. The federal government
should directly regulate the gray market and the price gouging
mechanisms used. Congress should pass the Fair Accountability
and Innovative Research Drug Pricing Act of 2016,17 currently
15 See id. at 7. The difference between direct legislation and indirect legislation, as it
appears in this Note, in terms of the gray market, is that direct legislation includes
language pertaining to the gray market. Meanwhile indirect legislation includes legislation
that may focus on the drugs or the national drug crisis rather than the gray market
distribution and the entities involved in that distribution.
16 These laws are ineffective and weak because they address the wrong aspects of the
pharmaceutical market if the goal is regulating the gray market. For example, the
Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) and Counterfeit Drug Task Force prevents the
introduction of counterfeit drugs and regulates the amount and which type of counterfeit
drugs are being introduced but do not prevent drugs from being distributed through the
gray market. The FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigation punishes violators of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the Federal Anti-Tampering Act which both oversee the safety
of food, drugs, and cosmetics but do not regulate the resale and distribution of drugs on the
gray market. See Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat.
95 (1988).
17 Fair Accountability and Innovative Research Pricing Act of 2016, H.R.6043, 114th
Cong. (2016). This bill amends the Public Health Service Act to require manufacturers of
certain drugs and biological products to report to the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) price increases that result in a 10% or more increase in the price of a drug
over a 12-month period. Reports are required for prescription drugs and drugs commonly
administered in hospitals, except vaccines, drugs for rare conditions, and drugs with annual
sales for Medicare and Medicaid enrollees of less than $1. Manufacturers that do not submit
a required report are subject to a civil penalty. The Inspector General of HHS must review
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proposed. This Act will increase price transparency and provide a
civil penalty for wrong doers. In addition to the passage of this
Act, there needs to be a direct attack on the gray market by
creating an act that does not allow companies to participate in
these distributions and ultimately form monopolies. This act
needs to prevent the bulk of the sale distributions of these lifesaving drugs going to specific entities; it could be a continuation of
the provisions first drafted in the Gray Market Reform Act
introduced in the 112th Congress.18 The companies that are
involved in gray market activity should also be criminally
punished for the lives they are affecting. In order for these new
regulations to succeed and be enforceable, there should be a
separate committee created that specifically addresses all gray
market activities. A new committee solely focused on the
pharmaceutical gray market will finally give the government a
fighting chance to put an end to this social injustice. This
committee could be given the power to enforce any new legislative
provisions with necessary fines and punishments.
Direct legislation can address the gray market problems in a
way that creates difficulties for companies to avoid the
regulations. With the proposed provisional acts in place and a
committee in place to enforce serious punishments, there would be
an increased awareness of the gray market issues and a
“watchdog” in place with effective means to put a stop to the
companies trying to continue participation in the gray market for
profit
at
the
expense
of
the
public.
Part II of this Note discusses the national drug shortage crisis,
drug price information to determine compliance. Collected penalty funds must be used to
carry out activities related to this reporting requirement and to improve consumer and
provider information about drug value and drug price transparency. Id.
18 Gray Market Drug Reform and Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 5853, 112th Cong.
(2012). This act amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to: (1) make it a
prohibited act and a misbranding for a wholesale distributor of prescription drugs to
purchase or receive a prescription drug from a pharmacy or a pharmacist; (2) require
annual reporting by wholesale distributors of prescription drugs; (3) require the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish and maintain a national database of
information reported by wholesale distributors of prescription drugs and to require such
database to include information on actions taken by states against wholesale distributors
(e.g., disciplinary actions and license revocations); (4) require the Secretary to assess and
collect fees from wholesale distributors of prescription drugs; and (5) require wholesale
distributors of prescription drugs to provide to recipients of a prescription drug in shortage
the sales price for such drug at the time of its sale and at the time of any prior sale of such
drug when it was in shortage. Id.
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a normal medication distribution chain, and the gray market and
its medication distribution network and issues. It also addresses
the effect of price gouging on the working poor and how some
pharmaceutical companies are creating monopolies and utilizing
gray market distribution channels to take advantage of the
situation by price gouging drugs. Examples of pharmaceutical
companies taking advantage of the national drug crisis are
exposed and analyzed. In Part III, this Note examines some of the
indirect legislation and regulation on price gouging in
pharmaceuticals in response to the emergence of the gray market.
It addresses why the current legislation does not effectively
regulate the gray market.
Part IV then describes the proposed legislation in the recent
Congresses, demonstrating how the government is beginning to
take action to increase the regulation on the gray market. Finally,
Part V of this Note proposes a solution to the gray market problem
and, as a result, price gouging in the pharmaceutical industry,
using current proposed legislation and a call for a direct federal
act that prevents manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and
drug companies from participating in the gray market and its
unfair practices by implementing criminal charges and civil
penalties for violators. This proposal also suggests that a new
executive committee be created so that this issue is continually
being addressed in an effective way. This committee would enforce
the new federal legislation being proposed in this Note.
II.  BACKGROUND
To understand price gouging in the pharmaceuticals market,
this section explains the major underlying causes: (1) the national
drug shortage problem and (2) the medical distribution market
and how it is affected by the emergence of the gray market.
Moreover, this section discusses the gray market’s history and the
economic and patient safety issues it causes.
A.   National Drug Shortage
A drug “currently in shortage,” as defined by the FDA, is “[a]
situation in which the total supply of all clinically interchangeable
versions of an FDA-regulated drug is inadequate to meet the
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current or projected demand at the user level.”19 Drug shortages
are caused by product quality concerns, discontinuation of product
lines, changes in supply and demand, raw material shortages, and
manufacturing problems.20
Between 2000 and 2004, the United States healthcare system
suffered irregular medication shortages.21 In 2005, these
shortages became an increasingly widespread problem throughout
the country;22 shortages of more than sixty “medically necessary”
drugs were reported in the FDA Drug Shortage Index.23
The shortages increased substantially to 251 in 2011.24 In 2012,
despite the fact that there were fewer new shortages, “more than
300 shortages remained active at the end of 2012”25 and
approximately 100 new medication shortages were reported by the
19 Frequently
Asked
Questions
about
Drug
Shortages,
FDA.GOV,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/ucm050796.htm (last updated July
5, 2018).
20 See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 10, at 11-12. According to Figure 2 in the Strategic
Plan for Preventing and mitigating Drug Shortages, the causes of drug shortages from most
influential to least are as follows: (1) Quality: Facility Remediation Efforts, (2) Quality:
Product Manufacturing Issues, (3) Discontinuation of Product, (4) Raw Materials (API)
Shortage, (5) Other Component Shortage, (6) Increased Demand, and (7) Loss of
Manufacturing Site. When a manufacturer experiences a discontinuance or interruption in
manufacturing, a shortage of the particular drugs that the manufacture makes will
experience a shortage if there is no other manufacturer to make that particular drug to fill
the recent void in addition to making up any loss that already occurred. Product disruptions
also occur when there is “a natural disaster or other unexpected event not within a
manufacturer’s control, or a business decision to permanently discontinue production of a
drug” due to the unprofitability of that specific drug. However, the primary factor that leads
to disruptions in manufacturing and inevitably a drug shortage, is failure in product or
facility quality. “In 2012, for example, based on information collected from manufacturers,
[the] FDA determined that the majority of production disruptions (66%) resulted from
either (1) efforts to address product-specific quality failures (31%, labeled Quality:
Manufacturing Issues in Figure 2) or (2) broader efforts to remediate or improve a
problematic manufacturing facility. Quality or manufacturing concerns can involve
compromised sterility, such as roof leakage; mold in manufacturing areas; or unsterilized
vials or containers to hold the product—issues that could pose extreme safety risks to
patients.” Id.
21 See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3.
22 KEVIN HANINGER, AMBER JESSUP & KATHLEEN KOEHLER, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
DATA POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES
OF DRUG SHORTAGES 3, 16 (2011) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
23 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, A REVIEW OF
FDA’S APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES 14-15 (2011) [hereinafter FDA’ S
APPROACH]. The recent increase in drug shortages affects 93% of drugs the FDA deems
“medically necessary.” Id.
24 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, PERMANENT
DISCONTINUANCE OR INTERRUPTION IN MANUFACTURING OF CERTAIN DRUG OR BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS; PROPOSED RULE 6 (2011).
25 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 10, at 8.

RENDE - MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

376

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2/6/19 4:25 PM

[Vol. 32:3

FDA.26 “Analysis of the data from [Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research’s] drug shortage database shows that the number of new
shortages significantly decreased, from 117 in 2012 to 44” in both
2013 and 2014 and, “[a]s of September 30, 2015, 22 new drug
shortages have been identified.”27 In the beginning of 2015, the
“FDA was notified of 131 potential shortage situations by 47
different manufacturers.”28 New drug shortages are decreasing;
however, once a drug is in short supply, the “shortage” lasts a
considerable amount of time.29
Despite so many drug shortages in recent years, manufacturers
have yet to increase production of these life-saving medications,30
even with the shortages resulting in “significant and life
threatening consequences” for patients.31 Most of these drug
shortages are concentrated in life-saving medications and generic
sterile injectables, which are commonly used in “cancer treatment,
anesthesia, emergency treatments, and nutritional therapies.”32
To address the drug shortage problem, the Federal Government
has been attempting to focus on manufacturers with current
legislation requiring notice of a shortage, but the “FDA receiving
advance notice of shortages fails to address the underlying
causes.”33 Although, 47 manufacturers notified the government of
potential shortages in 2015, there are fewer than 47
manufacturers that are actually manufacturing the drugs in

26 Thomas Sullivan, Prescription Drug Shortages: Crisis Abating- Still Need for Pricing
Reform, POL’Y & MED., http://www.policymed.com/2012/12/prescription-drug-shortagesare-becoming-persistent-in-us-html (last updated May 6, 2018).
27 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, THIRD ANNUAL
REPORT ON DRUG SHORTAGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2015, 8 (2015) [hereinafter THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT].
28 Id. at 4.
29 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 10, at 8. “The number of new drug shortages quadrupled
from approximately 60 in 2005 to more than 250 in 2011. These statistics reflect the number
of new shortages reported in a given year, but because shortages typically continue for
extended amounts of time, the actual number of shortages at a given point in time is likely
to be higher.” This means that once a drug is in shortage, it is difficult to fix the problem
for that particular drug. In order to get a drug off of a “shortage”, raw materials,
manufacturing, and supply all need to increase in amount and quality of multiple facilities
need to improve substantially. Id.
30 Stacey B. Lee, The Drug Shortage Crisis: When Generic Manufacturers “Just Say
No”, 93 OR. L. REV. 355, 358 (2014).
31 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3.
32 Id.
33 Lee, supra note 30, at 358.
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shortage.34 The FDA does not focus on the very few manufacturers
that are strictly manufacturing the life-saving drugs and instead
are focusing on manufacturers as a whole.35
Moreover, the drug shortage problem is one of the main causes
of price gouging in the pharmaceutical market.36 The supply and
demand relationship in the lifesaving pharmaceutical industry is
far from a traditional supply and demand relationship. The
pharmaceutical market, in this regard, has a demand-supply
inflexibility; any change in supply or demand can cause a shortage
of a medication.37 The only way that demand would change would
be if there was an increase in the amount of people getting a
certain illness or a certain allergy that needs the life-saving drugs.
Patients are constrained in their demand position once they have
the sickness because there is no choice but to deal with the amount
of supply offered.38 Additionally, for these drugs, demand “is often
unaffected by changes in price” because the necessity for the drugs
is too important; patients’ lives are controlled by manufacturers
because the demand is controlled by one’s health conditions
instead of one’s preference in a low price.39
To meet any increase in demand for life-saving drugs,
pharmaceutical companies just increase production, using current
34 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at 4. For example, the Epipen, one of the main
life-saving drugs that are being egregiously increased in price, is an injectable. The
“injectable market is highly concentrated with seven manufacturers producing the vast
majority of all the drugs . . . the majority of production of a given sterile injectable is done
by three or fewer manufactures.” Lee, supra note 30, at 364.
35 See FDA’S APPROACH, supra note 23, at 3. The FDA conducted a review of medical
product shortage activities in four product Centers in FDA and talked to external
stakeholders in the drug arena to understand their perspectives on the current drug
shortage problem. Based on these conversations, a review of published and unpublished
information on drug shortages, and analyses of existing or newly created databases, this
report concludes that the problem of medical product shortages is complex and stems from
economic, legal, regulatory, policy, and clinical decisions that are deeply interconnected. Id.
36 See Kate H. Gamble, Obama Ordering FDA to Help Reduce Drug Shortages,
PHARMACY TIMES (Oct. 30, 2011), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/obama-orderingfda-to-help-reduce-drug-shortages.
37 Id. Because there are so few of these manufacturers producing the lifesaver drugs,
the supply end of the supply and demand relationship is the controller of the relationship
and creates an environment for drugs to easily fall short in supply. Id.
38 See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3. When specific medications are not in supply, some
patients turn to alternative drugs. These alternative drugs, although sometimes effective,
are not always as effective as the preferred, unaffordable or unavailable drug. Sometimes
these alternatives create “significant side effects” and further issues with other medications
patients might be taking. Id.
39 Lee, supra note 30, at 366.
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manufacturing infrastructure without expanding.40 However, this
means that “any need for facility repairs or equipment
maintenance could cripple a manufacturer’s ability to maintain
sufficient output levels to prevent a shortage” because these
manufacturers have not undergone any updated changes to their
facilities since the 1960s.41
Additionally, these companies will produce just enough or even
less than the actual demand requires so that their inventory will
not suffer any consequences, like overstock, in the attempt to avoid
wasting products or resources.42 If companies did expand the
infrastructure, in addition to increasing production, the companies
would produce an excess of drugs and would be able to store them
effectively for longer periods of time. However, “[d]rugs have a
limited shelf life and holding excess inventory is costly,” so
“manufacturers face an asymmetry of incentives: there is little cost
. . . of producing too little of one drug . . . but a potentially high cost
of producing too much of that drug.”43 There is very little incentive
to overproduce the drugs because of the cost it takes to
overproduce and store the surplus of the drugs. This makes it
almost impossible for the supply to ever be in excess enough to
flood the market and deal with a major increase in demand
without experiencing shortages.
Ultimately, the problem of drug shortages is the root of an
extended chain of issues that lead first to the existence of the gray
market and then to the ability of drug companies to price gouge.
In order to address the injustice of price gouging groups of people
who cannot afford the drugs and the legal issues of the gray
market, the drug shortage is the underlying cause that needs to be
addressed.44 However, addressing the drug shortage issues is not
the only way to address price gouging.45 The gray market and its
40 Id. at 365. Expanding both infrastructure and production together will meet the
demand of these lifesaving drugs.
41 Id.
42 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 22, at 6.
43 Id. at 4-6.
44 A solution to the drug shortage is not within the scope of this Note. However, the
drug shortage problem was discussed here for necessary context to understand price
gouging and the gray market.
45 The problem can also be addressed through legislation.
The federal government has already passed legislation to address the
drug shortage crisis, but failed to adequately resolve the gray-market
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distribution differs greatly from a Normal Drug Distribution. This
is another issue to address as a major cause of price gouging.
B.   Pharmaceutical Markets
Previously mentioned was a discussion of the national drug
crisis and how it affects the pharmaceutical market in general. To
address the issue of price gouging in the pharmaceutical market,
there are a lot of moving parts to consider, including the normal
medical distribution chain, the emergence of the gray market and
its history, and the issues that the gray market poses. The
relationship between the national drug crisis, the pharmaceutical
gray market, the infiltration by gray market companies, and the
pharmaceutical price gouging generates a domino effect of
causally linked sequences of occurrences with price gouging being
the ending piece of the domino linkage chain.
a.   Normal Medical Distribution
Normal drug distribution chains include manufacturers,
wholesale distributors, and dispensers.46 The process begins with
manufacturers, who then sell the drug to a wholesale distributor,
who in turn sells to a hospital or pharmacy, which ultimately
administers the drug to patients.47 Federal statutes authorize
distributors to buy medications from manufacturers and send
them to pharmacies, hospitals, and other non-patient entities.48
Primary wholesale distributors buy drugs directly from
manufactures.49 Then the primary wholesale distributors sell
problem. While reducing shortages of medications will likely reduce
some of the gray market presence, it will not solve the problem of gray
market companies profiting at the suffering of sick patients and
desperate healthcare providers; nor will it solve the patient safety
concerns associated with gray market distribution.
Mahugh, supra note 12, at 2.
46 Id. at 3.
47 See Short-Supply Prescription Drugs, supra note 11, at 8. “Authorized distributors of
record” are also allowed in these chains but need to prove that they “established an ongoing
relationship to distribute” the drugs of a given manufacturer. Id. at 9; see also 21 U.S.C. §
353(d)(4) (2018). These “authorized distributors” are usually re-packagers and secondary
wholesalers. Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3-4.
48 21 U.S.C. § 353(c)(3)(B)(iii). Subparagraph (B)(iii) permits “a sale, purchase, or trade
of a drug or an offer to sell, purchase, or trade a drug among hospitals or other health care
entities which are under common control . . . .”
49 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 4.
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those drugs directly to pharmacies and hospitals.50 Secondary
wholesale distributors do the same thing as primary wholesale
distributors except that they buy their drugs from the primary
wholesalers.51 When a drug is distributed through the entire
normal drug distribution chain (through one or more wholesalers),
it arrives at the dispensing hospital or pharmacy ready to be sold
to a patient.52
Unfortunately, this normal distribution chain does not always
happen for certain life-saving drugs. When there is a predicted
drug shortage, a different, more skewed medical distribution is
created by entities taking advantage of the short supply. This
skewed medical distribution is called the gray market.
b.   The Emergence of the Gray Market in Pharmaceuticals
While a normal distribution network produces a chain that
follows a manufacturer to distributor to dispenser path, this
distribution network gets destroyed when there is a leakage in the
chain, allowing for gray market entities to infiltrate the chain and
therefore create the gray market. This section explains the
pharmaceutical gray market piece of the domino effect,
elaborating on what the gray market is and how companies are
promoting this market. In addition, this section discusses the
economic problems, the patient safety risks, and the drug quality
risks that are directly related to the existence of the gray market.
i.   History of the Gray Market
The pharmaceutical gray market is an “unofficial,
unauthorized, and unintended distribution network through
which secondary wholesalers buy and sell medications at inflated
prices.”53 For numerous years, gray markets have existed in
several different forms in various industries. When a distributer
50 Id.
51 Id. This happens very infrequently; however, there are some benefits in selling to

secondary wholesale distributors. For example, if a manufacturer or primary wholesaler is
overstocked in a particular drug, secondary wholesale distributors buy the surplus and save
those entities from keeping the drugs too long. Drugs do not last in inventory forever. Also,
secondary distributors can help in smaller, low volume transactions and sell to a remote,
more specific population. The secondary distributors can spread the drug sales to entities
that would not normally be in contact with the primary wholesalers. Id. at 4.
52 Id. at 5.
53 Id. at 1.
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buys a manufacturer’s goods internationally and imports them
into the United States or buys them cheap domestically and
competes with the other domestic goods—often times at cheaper
prices—it is called a gray market.54 The pharmaceutical drug gray
market is filled with opportunists that price gouge the drugs,
“taking full advantage of the low supply and high demand”
relationship that resulted from the national drug crisis that began
in 2000,55 becoming “an avenue for opportunists to profit from the
national drug crisis.”56 The national drug crisis creates an
environment that forces hospitals to choose alternative treatment,
if available, and more egregiously, choose which patient will
receive available medications.57 In a skewed life-saving drug
supply-demand relationship, the gray market is often times the
only distribution available: a doctor’s last resort.
A gray market medication distribution chain differs from a
normal drug distribution chain because it has a “leak” in its chain;
“one of the entities within the normal distribution network fails to
follow the authorized and intended steps.”58 Although secondary
wholesalers can be helpful at times, “wholesalers create
vulnerabilities in the links of the chain when they sell to other
wholesalers, enabling drugs to disperse out of the legitimate
supply and into the gray market.”59 The wholesalers do this to
make a profit off of the drug.60
There is no surplus of the drug that the wholesalers sell to other
wholesalers; they resell the drugs in order to increase the profits
made off of a particular drug due to unaffected high demand.61
54 Jevan Jammal, The Gray Market Infiltration of a Vulnerable United States Health
Care, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 553, 553 (2014).
55 Id. at 554.
56 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 5.
59 Jammal, supra note 54, at 564.
60 See Short-Supply Prescription Drugs, supra note 11, at 2. The FDA reports that gray
drugs are more likely to leak into a supply chain with multiple wholesalers. For example,
“the shipment of 25 vials of a chemotherapy drug called fluorouracil in September 2011
[had a] leakage point [at a] Maryland pharmacy called Priority Healthcare. Instead of
dispensing the drug to patients, the owner of this company, Marianna Pesti, sold the vials
to a New Jersey distributor called Tri-Med America, which was owned by Ms. Pesti’s
husband, Gabor Szilagyi. The drugs were sold five more times before reaching their end
user, a hospital in California.” Id. at 4.
61 Id. Selling to wholesalers even when there is not a surplus sometimes helps
companies make a profit because a secondary wholesaler will pay more for the drugs to
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Gray market companies sit back and watch the drug distributions
and the reports on the scarcity of drugs. Once there is a leak in
the chain of a drug in shortage being sold, they pounce by offering
high prices to wholesalers in order to be the highest bidder for that
particular drug, so that they can create a monopoly of a life-saving
drug.62 Once the drugs are bought and sold by multiple companies,
they are eventually sold to a dispensing entity at an egregiously
high price.63 The final price on gray market–traded drugs may
be hundreds of times higher than the price that the
manufacturer originally received from selling the product.64
Pharmacies are also partially to blame for empowering the gray
market. Licensed and unlicensed pharmacies are used as
purchasing agents for gray market companies; some pharmacies
that participated in a 2011 survey stated that they were contacted
to buy medications in short supply on the gray market companies’
behalf.65 Companies do this to avoid detection in the rare case that
there are pedigree systems.66 In addition, some companies went as
far as lying to the pharmacies by saying that the drugs would be
distributed to hospitals for free in order to curb the drug
shortages.67 Gray market companies and second wholesalers
would pay the pharmacies 12-15 percent more than the price the
pharmacies would pay for the drugs and then the entities would

make the drugs available to areas that are not near any other wholesaler or dispensing
entity. In addition, wholesalers can increase the price to an amount that a secondary
wholesaler will agree to in order to cover costs knowing that the secondary wholesaler will
be able to find gray market companies to buy the drugs. Id.
62 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 1.
63 See Short-Supply Prescription Drugs, supra note 11, at 4. In 2011, a Congressional
investigation by Representative Elijah Cummings, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, and
Senator Tom Harkin, reached out to five gray market companies believed to be aggressively
marketing to hospitals that were in short supply of drugs to treat cancer. Pedigrees named
125 different companies that at one time possessed one of the five short-supply drugs under
investigation. Id. at 3. The study found that in 69% of the 300 investigated distribution
chains, prescription drugs had been “leaked” into gray market chains, and had been sold
again by wholesalers to other gray market companies at large mark up prices. Id. at 4.
Additionally, gray market companies heavily advertise and market to the dispensing
entities to buy the drugs quickly. An example of such language is: “We only have 20 of this
drug left and quantities are going fast.” Id. at 7 n.21.
64 See id. at i-ii.
65 See id. at 16.
66 Id. at 92.
67 Id. at 17.
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charge 40 percent more for the drugs when selling them to other
dispensing entities such as other pharmacies and hospitals.68
For
example,
companies like
Mylan and
Turing
Pharmaceuticals are just two companies in the limelight for these
behaviors. The following examples show how the existence of the
gray market can result in an insanely high increase in the price of
life-saving drugs.
Recently, Mylan, the company that produces the Epipen,69 is
alleged to be gouging consumers with a retail price of $608 dollars
per two-pack.70 This is a 500% increase from the original price.71
In an interview, Mylan’s CEO, Heather Bresch, tried to justify the
price increase by mentioning discounts for patients.72 Bresch’s
interview ultimately showed that her justifications for the price
increase were weak.73
Additionally, Turing Pharmaceuticals is another company that
has price gouged life-saving drugs like, Daraprim.74 The company
received the selling rights for Daraprim from Impax, a California

68 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 5-6. Companies would market these medications to
hospitals and other dispensing entities in an aggressive way and portray the drug as a
“must have” before the price would go up. Id. at 6.
69 The EpiPen Auto-Injector “is a disposable, pre-filled automatic injection device that
administers epinephrine in the event of a severe allergic reaction.” How to Use EpiPen,
EPIPEN, http://www.epipen.ca/en/about-epipen/how-to-use?user=consumers (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017).
70 Dan Mangan & Anita Balakrishnan, Mylan CEO Bresch: ‘No one’s more frustrated
than
me’
about
EpiPen
price
furor,
CNBC
(Aug.
25,
2016),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/25/mylan-expands-epipen-cost-cutting-programs-aftercharges-of-price-gouging.html.
71 The Associated Press, New York attorney general investigates EpiPen manufacturer,
NCPR.ORG (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story
/32519/20160907/new-york-attorney-general-investigates-epipen-manufacturer.
72 See Melody Petersen, Mylan CEO blames rising cost of the EpiPen on ‘opaque’
industry pricing, LA TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lafi-mylan-ceo-20160921-snap-story.html; Associated Press, Mylan to launch a cheaper,
generic
version
of
EpiPen,
LA
TIMES
(Aug.
29,
2016,
2:35
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mylan-new-epipen-20160829-snap-story.html.
Tyrone Gayle, a Hilary Clinton spokesman, was quoted saying during Clinton’s campaign
that “discounts for selected customers without lowering the overall price of EpiPens are
insufficient, because the excessive price will likely be passed on through higher insurance
premiums.” Mangan, supra note 70.
73 See Petersen, supra note 72.
74 See Kevin McCoy, Former Shkreli firm responsible for 5,000% drug hike sued, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/05/02/former-shkreli-pharma-firmsued/83820888/ (last updated May 2, 2016, 3:04 PM) (“Daraprim is used to treat
toxoplasmosis, a potentially life-threatening illness that afflicts those with AIDS, cancer or
other conditions that weaken the immune system.”).
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company, in August 2015.75 Martin Shkreli, the CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals, raised the per-pill cost of Daraprim 5,000% from
$13.50 to $750 in 2015.76 The price increase created tremendous
turmoil in the media and “generated complaints from patients,
health industry experts and presidential candidates.”77 Shkreli
was questioned by the media and Congress about the increase in
price.78 Shkreli told the media that Daraprim, the once
unprofitable drug, was now profitable under his Turing
leadership, but pled the fifth when questioned by Congress.79 With
no straight answers on the price gouging activities, Shkreli
resigned from Turing in December.80
In addition to the above practices, these companies that buy the
drugs eventually have a monopoly on specific drugs.81 They buy up
an entire supply or nearly almost an entire supply of the drug to
have complete control, resulting in dispensing entities having no
other choice but to buy from them.82 Thus, the gray market and its
players are free to continue its practices.
ii.   Issues with Drug Shortages and the Gray Market
The gray market poses many issues for dispensing entities and,
ultimately, patients. For health care, the gray market creates
tensions between access, quality of care, and high costs.83 There is
a lack of transparency in distribution networks as there are
constant investigative failures in revealing who gets the drugs and
from where.84 This lack of transparency creates an environment
that leads to endless, unregulated gray market activity, which

75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Ariana Eunjung Cha, CEO Martin Shkreli: 4,000 percent drug hike is
‘altruistic,’
not
greedy,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Sept.
22,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/09/22/turing-ceo-martinshkreli-explains-that-4000-percent-drug-price-hike-is-altruistic-…1/3/?noredirect=on.
79 See McCoy, supra note 74; Cha, supra note 78.
80 McCoy, supra note 74.
81 See Joshua Gregg, The Implications, Negative Health Effects, Legal Issues, and
Potential Solutions Associated with the Shortage of Essential Drugs in the U.S. Medical
Care Market, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 384 (2015).
82 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 3.
83 Jammal, supra note 54, at 562.
84 Id. at 564 n.55.
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then results in economic hardships and health risks for patients,
in addition to poor drug quality in the life-saving drugs.85
1.   ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Price gouging occurs easily when gray market companies
can participate in gray market distribution chains.86 Price gouging
concerns arise because the gray market allows the medications to
pass through so many entities.87 When healthcare providers are
faced with life and death situations daily, some hospitals resort to
purchasing life-saving drugs on the gray market at “exorbitant
prices.”88 The expensive gray market resales do not seem to be
slowing down any time soon, making the end prices extremely
unaffordable for the last buyers, which are usually the dispensing
entities and patients.89
A study by Premier Healthcare Alliance researched 416
different medications that were used to treat emergencies and
serious conditions, such as cancer and infectious disease; the study
concluded that these medications had an average markup of 650
percent above the original market price.90 Even more appalling
are the markup prices of the most critical medications—averaging
1,721 percent to 4,533 percent above the original price.91 Some
companies have even marked up the prices as much as 5,000
percent or more without any repercussions from regulating
authorities.92 Finally, one study concluded that the average

85
86
87
88
89

See id. at 567-69.
See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 1-2.
See id.
Lee, supra note 30, at 362.
See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 6-7. Insurance companies are also affected by the
increased prices of the lifesaving drugs. Insurance companies could cover the cost of some
drugs, depending on the insurance company and the plan coverage. However, this coverage
might come at a cost of high premiums to the insured. While this is certainly a significant
concern, this Note does not discuss the role insurance companies play in the price of these
drugs resulting from gray market practices. See Potarazu, supra note 3.
90 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 6; Lee, supra note 30, at 362-63.
91 Coleen Cherici, Patrick McGinnis & Wayne Russell, BUYER BEWARE: DRUG
SHORTAGES AND THE GRAY MARKET, PREMIER HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE 2 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.anco-online.org/GrayMarketAnalysis-Premier.pdf.
92 Id. at 3.
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markup was 650 percent while another found that most medical
markups were around 900 percent.93
These egregiously high markups affect most of the patients that
are in need of the medications because the medications are
unaffordable.
CNN reporter, Sreedhar Potarazu, reported
“[b]ased on a recent survey by Consumer Reports, 33% of
Americans” were paying an additional $39 out of pocket for regular
prescriptions drugs they needed.94 The working poor and the
middle class are struggling in a more egregious way: “For lowincome and many fixed-income Americans, paying the rising cost
of prescription drugs” and life-saving drugs forces them to cut back
on daily expenses like groceries or rent payments.95 According to
the Consumer Reports survey, seven percent of people said that
due to these increased prices, they had to skip a mortgage
payment.96 Additionally, the survey reported that one out of four
people were unable to pay their medication bills and had to stop
getting their prescriptions filled.97 Due to the egregiously high
prices, the working poor and the middle class in America have no
choice but to make immense sacrifices in their daily lives or, even
worse, stop treatment and risk poor health.
Not being able to afford medications is not the only consequence
of high prices. Eventually, patient safety and the quality of the
drugs are also impacted by the high prices.
2.   PATIENT SAFETY
Gray market pharmaceuticals also have negative effects on
patient health and safety in the United States.98 First, quantity
needs are not being fulfilled. “According to an AHA survey,
seventy-eight percent of respondents reported rationing or

93 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 6; Gray Market, Black Heart: Pharmaceutical Gray
Market Finds a Disturbing Niche During the Drug Shortage Crisis, INST. FOR SAFE
MEDICATION PRACS. 5 (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.ismp.org/Newsletters/acutecare/
showarticle.aspx?id=3.
94 Potarazu, supra note 3, at 2.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Jammal, supra note 54, at 553.
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restricting drugs.”99 When there is no alternative to a life-saving
drug, one physician stated, “I guess patients just have to die.”100
Second, another related concern is the use of alternative
medications that are inferior, compromised, or ineffective.101
Providers are prescribing second-line alternatives because of the
unavailability of life-saving treatments.102 In the same AHA
survey, sixty-nine percent of respondents indicated that patients
received a less effective drug after turning to the gray market due
to shortages, and thirty-five percent reported that patients that
were given those alternative treatments “have experienced
adverse outcomes.”103 In another study, “[t]welve percent reported
side effects or other problems attributable to drugs supplied by the
gray market.”104
3.   POOR DRUG QUALITY
“In addition to paying exorbitant prices, hospitals acquiring
drugs through the gray market have no guarantee of the drug’s
quality.”105 “[D]rugs sold through the gray market may be diluted,
expired, contaminated, or relabeled with the wrong
information,”106 or “improperly repackaged, re-labeled, and
possibly stored under unsuitable conditions, as well as replaced by
counterfeits, compromising their integrity and safety.”107 Because
drugs in the gray market are not being regulated, they may be
unsafe even if they are being labeled and sold as the same drug
purchased though the regular market.
Because the national drug crisis affects the pharmaceutical
market and has enabled the gray market to proliferate,
Americans, particularly the working poor and middle class, are

99 AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, AM. HOSP. ASS’N at 9 (July 12, 2011),
www.aha.org/content/11/drugshortagesurvey.pdf.
100 Lee, supra note 30, at 362.
101 See AHA SURVEY ON DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 99, at 8.
102 Lee, supra note 30, at 361.
103 Id. at 362.
104 Id. at 363.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Thomas A. Hemphill, Should the FDA Regulate Drug ‘Gray Markets’?, CATO INST.,
Fall
2015,
at
3,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/policyreport/2015/9/regulation-v38n3-6.pdf.
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experiencing the many negative consequences.108 These negative
consequences include economic concerns, patient safety risks, and
compromised drug quality.109 These consequences are normally
addressed with legislation and regulations to control the
pharmaceutical market; however, these laws do not include
language pertaining to the gray market, and therefore they only
indirectly affect it and do not directly address these issues.110
III.   INDIRECT LEGISLATION AND REGULATION ON THE GRAY
MARKET CURRENTLY IN PLACE
In the United States, all food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical
devices are regulated under the authority of the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”).111 The FDA was created by the
government in response to the pressing need to address the
public’s safety with respect to its food and drugs.112
Legislation concerning the normal drug distribution is
thorough; however, these acts that regulate the normal drug
distribution fail to fully address the gray market problem, having
only an indirect effect on the gray market.113 This section
discusses the current federal legislation and regulations
addressing pharmaceutical drugs, including the Prescription Drug
Marketing Act, the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigation, the
Federal Trade Commission Act, Executive Order No. 13,588, and
the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act.
However, because the legislation only indirectly effects the gray
market, most of these laws fail to regulate the pharmaceutical
market properly.114 This section also includes a discussion of the
lack of state legislation and regulation.
108
109
110
111

See Potarazu, supra note 3.
See supra part (II)(B)(b).
See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 1, 7-8.
What
does
FDA
Regulate?,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated Aug.
22, 2018).
112 See When and why was FDA formed?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm214403.htm (last updated Aug. 22,
2018).
113 See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 1, 7-8. Indirect legislation and regulation refer to
current legislation and regulations that do not address the gray market specifically, but
that do address other aspects of the pharmaceutical market.
114 See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 1, 7-8.
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A. Federal Legislation and Attempts at Attacking the Gray
Market
a. Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) and Counterfeit
Drug Task Force
One of the FDA’s first attempts to address price gouging was in
the 1980s “in response to companies and individuals buying and
selling counterfeit medications through unauthorized gray market
distribution channels,” but it had no means of enforcement.115 In
1987, the FDA implemented the Prescription Drug Amendment
Act of 1987 (“PDMA”) to “increase safeguards to prevent the
introduction and retail sale of substandard, ineffective, and
counterfeit drugs in the US supply chain.”116 In addition to the
Act, the FDA created a Counterfeit Drug Task Force to evaluate
the problem of the gray market, mainly focusing on the counterfeit
drugs at the time and how the government should try and find a
solution to the increase in counterfeit drugs.117
The idea of pedigree systems was a result of the increase in
counterfeit drugs.118 Although pedigree systems would have been
helpful to the Counterfeit Drug Task Force, they were mentioned
115 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 7.
116 Prescription Drug Amendment Act of 1987, 21 C.F.R. § 203 (2018); Prescription

Drug
Marketing
Act
of
1987,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendments
totheFDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketingActof1987/ucm2005644.htm (last updated Mar.
29, 2018); 21 C.F.R. § 203.1 (2018) (“This part sets forth procedures and requirements
pertaining to the importation and wholesale distribution of prescription drugs, including
both bulk drug substances and finished dosage forms; the sale, purchase, or trade of (or the
offer to sell, purchase, or trade) prescription drugs, including bulk drug substances, that
were purchased by hospitals or health care entities, or donated to charitable organizations;
and the distribution of prescription drug samples”); 21 C.F.R. § 203.2 (2018) (“The purpose
of this part is to implement the Prescription Drug Amendments of 1992, except for those
sections relating to State licensing of wholesale distributors (see part 205 of this chapter),
to protect the public health, and to protect the public against drug diversion by establishing
procedures, requirements, and minimum standards for the distribution of prescription
drugs and prescription drug samples.”).
117 See Marvin M. Goldenberg, New FDA Initiatives in Response To the Problem of
Counterfeit Drugs, 30(3) PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 166, 166, 171-72.
https://www.ashp.org/news/2003/08/20/fda_launches_new_initiative_to_battle_counterfeit
_drugs.
118 Counterfeit Drug Task Force Report 2006 Sections I and II: Introduction and
Background,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Sept.
10,
2009),
https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20170114034344/http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety
/ucm172773.htm.
Pedigree systems identify what exactly is being bought and sold. See Prescription Drug
Amendment Act of 1987, 21 C.F.R. § 203 (2018).
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but never put in place in 1987; these pedigree papers would be
provided to the purchasers of these drugs with information
regarding the prior sale or trade of the drug dating back to the
manufacturer.119 Stricter, more accurate pedigree systems,
although more costly to companies and entities, could provide
information for regulation enforcers.120 In 2006, the FDA amended
the act to include a definition of an “authorized distributor” and
the subsequent statutory provision that all unauthorized
distributors must satisfy pedigree requirements that includes,
among other criteria, dosage, container size, date of each previous
transaction, business name and addresses of all parties
involved.121 When pharmaceutical companies challenged the
additional provision about unauthorized distributors in court, the
“court found that providing pedigree information upon
distribution would increase consumer costs in the form of
insurance premiums and prescription drug prices,” ruling in favor
of the companies and not requiring a pedigree system.122
Ultimately, the PDMA and the task force did not have the
adequate funds or government support to regulate the gray
market properly.
b. FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigation
In addition to the PDMA, the FDA also employs its Office of
Criminal Investigations to examine violations of federal statutes,
such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Anti-

119 21 C.F.R. § 203 (“The PDMA states that an authorized distributor of record is a
distributor that has an ‘ongoing relationship’ with a manufacturer to distribute that
manufacturer’s drug. However, the PDMA does not define “ongoing relationship.”). This
makes it easier to detect distributors that are not common in addition to also detecting the
more common distributors that participate in price gouging.
120 See id.
121 See id. §203.50. This requirement reaches the entities that are not approved by the
FDA. Essentially, making it a requirement for any entity to report information to close any
transparency gaps. See also Jammal, supra note 54, at 574-76.
122 RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 467 F. Supp. 2d 285,
292 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 285 F. App’x 809, 809 (2d Cir. 2008); Jammal, supra note 54, at
570 (“The court . . . acknowledge[d] a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in favor
of the pharmaceutical companies’ equal protection claim against the FDA. The court found
a public interest in exempting ‘unauthorized wholesale distributors’ from providing
pedigree information in order to allow smaller distributors to provide drugs for their
customers and stay in business.”).
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Tampering Act.123 Both of these acts oversee the safety of food,
drugs, and cosmetics and the tampering of any consumer products
that can be harmful to the public.124 These acts are a step in the
right direction to regulate the gray market because they are
attempting to address the patient safety and drug quality issues
the gray market creates. However, they are not as effective as
intended because the “FDA exercises direct authority over the
approval and manufacture of drugs, while the states have primary
authority over distribution, repackaging, dispensing, returns and
disposal of medicines. And most states don’t have the authority,
resources or knowledge to regulate and monitor the industry.”125
The problems that result from the gray market often happen in
the distribution chain, which is normally regulated by state law,
so the Federal Government struggles to be an influential regulator
at times over these matters.
c.   Obama’s Executive Order
On October 31, 2011, in response to increasing drug shortages,
President Obama issued an executive order that directed the FDA
to use its existing authority “to require drug manufacturers to
provide
adequate
advance
notice
of
manufacturing
discontinuances that could lead to shortages” of life-saving
drugs.126 The order provides that the FDA and the Department of
Justice work together to see if entities are hoarding medications
during the drug shortages.127 The executive order also required
the FDA “to expedite its regulatory reviews, including reviews of
new drug suppliers, manufacturing sites, and manufacturing
changes” and to “communicate to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
any findings that shortages have led market participants to
stockpile the affected drugs.”128 This executive order is directed at
the gray market because it tries to determine the new entities

123 See
About
OCI,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm550316.htm (last updated Mar. 12,
2018); Mahugh, supra note 12, at 7.
124 Federal Anti-Tampering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2018); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 331 (2018).
125 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
126 Exec. Order No. 13,588, 76 Fed Reg. 68,295 (Oct. 31, 2011).
127 See id.; Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
128 76 Fed Reg. 68,295 (2011).
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entering the distribution chain.129 Additionally, it indirectly
addresses gray market concerns by focusing on the drug crisis by
determining what drugs are falling subject to shortages before it
becomes a big enough problem for the drugs to enter the gray
market.130 However, the executive order’s only enforceable power
involves “further investigation, not concrete regulation.”131
d.   Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act
In July 2012, President Obama signed the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (“FDASIA”) into law.132
This Act was aimed at the drug crisis problem instead of the gray
market problem; it expands the scope of drug shortage reporting
requirements.133 The Act amended the existing Food, Drug, &
Cosmetic Act drug shortage notification requirements and adds
new notice provisions.134 Notice requirements will apply to all
manufacturers of medically important, approved and unapproved
drugs.135 All manufacturers, within six months of the drug
actually falling into short supply, must report if a medication is
likely to become permanently wiped out and the reasons behind
the shortage or depletion.136
In addition, the FDA’s responsibilities pertaining to the public
are expanded by this act because the FDA is required to create a
process for public entities that will make it easier to report such
important facts regarding drugs.137 The FDA is also obliged to
annually report to Congress which drugs are anticipated to have
129
130
131
132

See id.
See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
Id.
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126
Stat. 993 (2012).
133 See id. The act was an extension of Obama’s executive order in regard to the
reporting requirements. See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
134 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, §§ 715, 1002; Lee, supra
note 30, at 380 (“Title X of the Act: (1) expands drug supply disruption and reporting
requirements, (2) directs the FDA to take specific actions to prevent or mitigate shortages,
(3) creates a mechanism for tracking drug shortage data and sharing that information with
key stakeholders, and (4) establishes a task force to analyze the causes of drug shortages
and devise strategic plans that address the shortages. . . . Title X also expands the scope of
drugs subject to shortage notification to include drugs used during emergency medical care
or surgery.”).
135 §§ 1001, 1002.
136 § 1001.
137 See id. FDA also must maintain a publicly available list of drugs shortage. Id.
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shortages; the report includes a plan describing ways to prevent
the drug shortage or mitigate the drug shortage of a particular
drug.138 The FDA should not take any enforcement action that
could have an adverse impact on a drug’s supply center before
sending a warning to the supply chain; the impact of a warning
letter, according to this Act, can sometimes be a sufficient way to
prevent the continued bad faith practices before taking any
enforcement action.139
FDASIA, however, is not directed at the gray market because,
even though fixing the national drug crisis issue would eventually
destroy the gray market by making more life-saving medications
available in the normal distribution channel, addressing the
national drug crisis is an entirely separate issue on its own and
will not directly impact the gray market immediately.140 The
distribution chain and the leakage points are the major
contributing factor to the success of the gray market.141 The
national drug crisis simply creates an environment for the entities
to participate in the gray market; a shortage of drugs cannot be
repaired overnight. To cease gray market operation more quickly,
more regulation needs to be directed at the distribution itself.
e.   Federal Trade Commission
In an attempt to create enforceable regulations, senators started
to request that the FTC get involved to prevent unfair practices by
gray market participants.142 Involvement included examining the
behaviors of the gray market companies and entities involved with
the gray market to see if there were any violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.143 The Federal Trade Commission Act is
138 Id.; Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
139 See § 1003; Lee, supra note 30, at 376-77 (“As part of addressing issues raised in

FDA warning letters, all of the recipients temporarily halted production. When explaining
these concurrent production stoppages to Congress, the FDA stated that they were
voluntary manufacturer decisions. However, given the explicit threat contained in FDA
warning letters (‘[f]ailure to promptly correct these violations may result in legal action
without further notice including, without limitation, seizure and injunction’), the
‘voluntariness’ of such action is questionable. By February 2012, fifty-eight percent of the
drugs in short supply were manufactured by one or more of the facilities that had received
a warning letter from the FDA and were undergoing remediation efforts.”).
140 See Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
141 See id. at 5-6.
142 Lee, supra note 30, at 399.
143 Id.
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an important statute and is empowered to do many helpful things
relating to federal trade:
[It] is the primary statute of the Commission. Under
this Act, as amended, the Commission is
empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent
unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce;
(b) seek monetary redress and other relief for
conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe rules
defining with specificity acts or practices that are
unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements
designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d)
gather and compile information and conduct
investigations relating to the organization,
business, practices, and management of entities
engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and
legislative recommendations to Congress and the
public.144
Essentially, the FTC could prevent and investigate any unfair
methods of competition and conduct investigations on entities
relating to entities engaged in commerce and then suggest
legislation to Congress.145 With this power, the FTC could have
some impact, preventing certain entities from participating in the
gray market. The senators wanted the FTC to look into the
healthcare delivery system and the effect the gray market was
having on the access to lifesaving drugs.146 The FTC has done
some investigations, but none have been reported to the public.147
The FTC, although a body of government that can make a
difference, only investigates and studies the gray market but does
not take action against the gray market and its unethical
practices.
144 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2018); Federal Trade
Commission Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federaltrade-commission-act (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
145 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
146 Lee, supra note 30, at 399.
147 See Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How Anticompetitive
Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing by Hospital Group Purchasing
Organizations (GPOs) Caused the U. S. Drug Shortage, CARE & COST (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://careandcost.com/2012/02/14/connecting-the-dots-how-anticompetitive-contractingpractices-kickbacks-and-self-dealing-by-hospital-group-purchasing-organizations-gposcaused-the-u-s-drug-shortage/; Lee, supra note 30, at 399.
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B. State Legislation and Attempts at Attacking the Gray Market
States are attempting to address the gray market by
determining who the true underlying entities are in the gray
market distribution. States are attempting to regulate certain
aspects relating to the gray market, such as wholesalers, but they
are not regulating the distribution of the drugs which is another
big aspect of the gray market as well.148 States are focusing on
their pharmacies and wholesalers by implementing state pedigree
systems in order to slow the gray market down and provide a more
concrete way for legitimate drugs to be bought;149 pedigree
systems require a record of what the drug is and where it was
made with all of the buyers listed.150 Having a list of all of this
information will make the gray market more transparent and
easier to target for regulators.
“While state and federal law requires wholesalers . . . to provide
a pedigree documenting the drug’s distribution route,
manufacturers and authorized distributors are exempt from such
requirements.”151 California is making manufacturers equally
accountable to report information on a pedigree system.152
California implemented an electronic pedigree system about a
decade ago, but it only has started being used and put into
effect.153 Although states have the legislative power to affect the
distribution of these drugs, they do not.154 This further shows why
federal legislation is needed.
148 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR MODEL ST. DRUG LAWS, DRUG PEDIGREE REQUIREMENTS FOR
PHARMACIES
AND
WHOLESALERS
STATE
STATUTES
(2010),
http://www.namsdl.org/library/3B95E55C-1C23-D4F9-74025D5E2B9B3371/.
149 See id.
150 See supra note 121.
151 Jammal, supra note 54, at 570.
152 Stephen Barlas, California e-Pedigree Rules Pose Challenges for Pharmacies, 33(6)
PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS, 360, 360 (2008).
153 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4163.5 (2011) (repealed 2015). Pedigree systems can
affect the gray market because the companies will be identified more easily by the FDA in
addition to there being more of a warning as to what target drugs the gray market will turn
to next.
154 The states that are trying to address the issue are not succeeding.
Four states - Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, and Texas - have enacted
laws restricting the price gouging behaviors by putting a cap on price
increases for medication or medical supplies during declared
emergencies. Other states have laws addressing price gouging for goods
generally during declared emergencies. However, laws addressing
price-gouging behaviors only during declared emergencies do not
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IV.  CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Although current legislation does not directly affect the gray
market, some proposed legislation would reduce the negative
effects that the existence of the gray market creates.155 The 112th
and 113th Congresses proposed legislation to address the gray
market problems.156 These laws propose to prohibit secondary
wholesalers from buying drugs from pharmacies, hold wholesalers
accountable for their actions, increase reporting requirements,
and make price gouging illegal during a time of shortage.157 While
these proposed regulations will have an impact on the gray market
and price gouging, they fall short of being effective because they
promote, at times, too much regulation on the wholesalers and did
not have enough support in Congress to be passed.158
A.   112th Congress
a.   Gray Market Drug Reform (Transparency Act of 2012)
This act, referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
was introduced to the House of Representatives in May 2012 by
Representative Cummings.159 However, this act was not
introduced in the 113th Congress or the 114th Congress.160 This
act essentially amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
by “prohibit[ing] a secondary wholesaler from purchasing or
receiving a prescription medication from a pharmacy or a
pharmacist.”161 In addition, it would increase reporting
requirements for those entities that are involved with any type of
drug distribution, call for a national wholesaler distributor
address the gray market problems during drug shortages, unless
federal or state governments decide to declare drug shortages
emergencies.
Mahugh, supra note 12, at 8.
155 Gray Market Drug Reform and Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 5853, 112th Cong.
(2012).
156 Id.; Gray Market Drug Reform and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1958, 113th
Cong. (2013).
157 H.R. 5853; H.R. 1958.
158 H.R. 5853; H.R. 1958.
159 H.R. 5853; Mahugh, supra note 12, at 9.
160 H.R. 5853; Mahugh, supra note 12, at 9.
161 H.R. 5853; Mahugh, supra note 12, at 9. Pharmacies that sell back to wholesalers
are a part of the problem that creates the leakage in the distribution chain of the gray
market. Mahugh, supra note 12, at 5.
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database, and collect fees from the distributors.162 “Notably, the
act would require each person engaged in wholesale distribution
of interstate drug commerce to annually report their name, contact
information, place of business and licensing information to each
state’s Secretary of State in which that person conducts his or her
business.”163 This would help enforcement groups identify the
trouble makers in the gray market that are increasing the prices
with every sale.164 The act would also require that information
regarding short supply medication prices be reported and have a
detailed history of that short supply of the particular drug.165
However, the bill does have some weaknesses. Even if the
Secretary of State checks on the wholesalers, the same outrageous
prices for drugs needed for patients would remain constant
because it just requires reporting the information but does not
prohibit price increases.166 Another reason this act was not
reintroduced into recent Congresses was because it prohibited
secondary wholesalers from buying medications from
pharmacies.167 A complete ban, although perhaps somewhat
effective in preventing distribution chain leaks, would hinder the
benefits that secondary wholesalers provide in their role in the
supply-distribution chain.168 However, even though the act does
not directly prohibit price gouging, it would make it very possible
for law makers and the government to spot who the gray market
companies are and how they are getting access to these drugs
before any price gouging activities happen.169 The act makes it
easy for the government to identify illegitimate behaviors of gray
market companies and regulate the market.170

162 H.R. 5853. The database would have collections of the reported data and
information on actions against wholesale distributors by state governments. Mahugh,
supra note 12, at 9. The fee collection will also give the government more funds to increase
its enforcement power. Id.
163 Jammal, supra note 54, at 573. All the reported information would be available on
the FDA’s website for anyone to observe. Id. See also H.R. 5853 § 3(a).
164 See Jammal, supra note 54, at 573; H.R. 5853.
165 H.R. 5853.
166 Jammal, supra note 54, at 574.
167 H.R. 5853 § 1(a).
168 Mahugh, supra note 12, at 9.
169 See id.
170 Id.
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b.   Protecting Patients and Hospitals from Price Gouging Act
In September 2012, Senator Schumer introduced, in the
Senate, the second proposed federal bill attempting to attack the
gray market.171 This act was referred to the Committee on Health,
Education Labor and Pensions, but it was not reintroduced in the
113th Congress.172 This act would have made price gouging of
prescription drugs during a time of shortage an illegal activity.173
Wholesale distributors would be held accountable if they charged
“unreasonably excessive” prices for short supply drugs.174 The
accountability that distributors would be subjected to could
include imprisonment up to 3 years, fines up to $500,000, or a
combination of both.175 Unfortunately, even with the potential
benefits that this act could create, it was not passed.
B.   114th Congress’ Fair Accountability and Innovative Research
Act
The Fair Accountability and Innovative Research Drug Pricing
Act of 2016 was introduced in the 114th Congress by
Representative Schakowsky.176 It was referred to the House of
Energy and Commerce.177 This bill requires manufacturers of
certain drugs to report price increases that result in a “10 percent
or more” increase in the price of a drug “over a 12-month
period.”178 A civil penalty is given to manufacturers that do not
submit a required report.179 “[T]he Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services shall annually review”
drug price information to determine compliance, and any collected
penalty fees go towards improving the thoroughness of the
reported information and price transparency.180 The Fair
171 Id.; see also Protecting Patients and Hospitals From Price Gouging Act, S. 3622,
112th Cong. (2012).
172 S. 3622.
173 Id. § 2(b).
174 Id. §§ 3, 5.
175 S. 3622 § 5.
176 Fair Accountability and Innovative Research Pricing Act of 2016, H.R.6043, 114th
Cong. (2016).
177 Id.
178 Id. § 1(b).
179 Id. § 399OO(b).
180 Id. § 399OO(e).
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Accountability and Innovative Research Act, if passed, will be the
only recent act that addresses proper price increase reporting
requirements and will be a great start to shutting down the gray
market.
The proposed laws address very specific groups participating in
the gray market. Some of them only address one type of group
that is involved in the gray market and price gouging.
Additionally, the current laws in place are geared more towards
awareness and lack any enforcement power. The pharmaceutical
gray market is not regulated. Proponents of regulating it often
struggle to gain support because of the laissez-faire attitude of
American business. Many Americans prioritize profits and
economic gain. Lobbyists will support big business.
The gray market also may not be regulated because of the lack
of resources to investigate the issue, identify the issue, and enforce
the punishment of such a big issue. Gray market price gouging
has multiple moving parts; thus, it needs a solution that attacks
the multiple moving parts.
This Note calls for three proposed acts to be passed because they
address each group that participates in the gray market from a
different angle. This Note suggests that all the acts be passed
together as one act or all three separately with a committee
alongside the legislation to be the enforcing agent.
V.  PROPOSAL
Pharmaceutical price gouging is difficult to regulate. The
gray market and gray market companies are major factors
controlling the price of life-saving pharmaceuticals. Attempting to
regulate the gray market will, at the very least, prevent the resale
of the drugs and regulate one of the channels that creates an
environment for entities to price gouge. Because states are illequipped to handle an issue of this magnitude, this Note proposes
federal intervention. Picture a one-way bridge with two lanes.
One lane is the gray market channel, and the other is the price
gouging companies’ monopoly channel. The beginning of the
bridge is the national drug crisis, and the end of the bridge is the
price gouged life-saving pharmaceuticals. This Note proposes to
shut down the gray market channel lane. The gray market
companies and pharmaceutical companies will still be able to have
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a monopoly on some of the life-saving drugs; however, the normal
market will fix that issue itself. So, just as shutting one lane down
would increase the traffic in the other lane and make it more
difficult to get to the other side of the bridge, shutting down the
gray market would increase the drug supply in the regular market
and make it more difficult to price gouge. Competitors can more
easily compete with these companies with the decrease in the
number of resales in the gray market.
For example, recently, CVS has announced that it is introducing
a generic EpiPen that is only five dollars more than the original
hundred-dollar price for a two pack from Mylan.181 With more
companies, like CVS, entering the market, companies that are
price gouging will be forced to decrease their prices in order to stay
competitive.182 Companies will no longer be able to hoard a supply
of a life-saving drug while increasing the price because they will
have to worry about staying competitive with rival companies.183
The gray market is the connecting piece from the national drug
crisis to price gouging by companies that monopolize life-saving
drugs. Regulating the gray market will make it more difficult for
companies to price gouge because the prices will not be resold
multiple times at higher and higher prices.
Considering the number of players involved with the gray
market and price gouging, a solution to the problem should be a
multi-step process. First, there should be legislation to address
the manufacturers. The manufacturers are the beginning of the
drug distribution chain in the gray market, and there are few
manufacturers in the market for life-saving drugs.184 By first
regulating the manufacturers and the prices they set by giving
them a price range in which the drugs can be set, there would be
more control in the beginning stages of drug distribution. Next,
there should be legislation to address the wholesalers and
distributors.185 Wholesalers and distributors are the entities in a
181 Ben Popken, Cigna Changes to Cheaper Generic EpiPen, CVS Cuts Rival’s Prices,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2017, 4:05 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/cignadrops-name-brand-epipen-while-cvs-offers-generic-100-n706171.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See supra notes 7, 35.
185 See supra Part III. This Note mentioned earlier that laws governing wholesalers
and distributors in pharmaceutical markets are controlled by state law; however,
presumably when drugs are sold, they are sold across state borders, making the regulation
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drug distribution chain that cause a leakage and allow drugs to
enter the gray market. Having regulation that directly addresses
the actions of these specific entities will solve issues regarding the
re-distribution of drugs and, therefore, make it more difficult for
entities and companies to price gouge. Lastly, there should be
legislation to address the drug companies (the companies that are
the actual manufacturers themselves and the companies that just
buy and sell the drugs) that are participating in the gray market
and egregiously increasing the price of drugs in the final step of
drug distribution. All of these types of laws should be enacted
together (or in quick succession) to affect all the players at once.
Alternatively, if passing three separate acts in such a short
amount of time is unrealistic, a new single law that encompasses
regulation of the three different groups should be passed. In
addition to the legislation, there should also be a committee
created strictly for the purposes of regulating and enforcing the
new legislation. Specifically, the committee should focus only on
the gray market and price gouging.
The Federal Government should directly regulate the gray
market and the price gouging mechanisms used. The Fair
Accountability and Innovative Research Drug Pricing Act of 2016
should be passed in its entirety the way it is currently drafted.186
The reporting provisions and the civil remedy provisions in the act
would be a great start in addressing the gray market issues.187
The Act addresses manufacturers as persons who control the price
of medications initially, and requires drug price transparency.188
This act is directed at the manufacturers that set the price of the
drug in the beginning but does not mention distribution or price
fixing afterwards.189
In order to address the wholesalers and distributors involved in
the gray market, an act introduced in the 112th Congress, The
Gray Market Drug Reform and Transparency Act of 2012, should
of distributors and wholesalers subject to federal law under the Commerce Clause. In
addition, the proposed federal legislation had provisions governing both wholesalers and
distributors, implying that the legislators presume they have jurisdiction over this matter.
This Note will adopt that presumption as well.
186 Fair Accountability and Innovative Research Pricing Act of 2016, H.R.6043, 114th
Cong. (2016).
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
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be passed.190 This Act addresses the stage of the gray market that
involves the leakage of the chain.191 This Act would increase
reporting requirements and prohibit a secondary wholesaler from
purchasing or receiving a prescription medication from a
pharmacy or a pharmacist.192 Because the regulations on the
secondary wholesalers received some pushback when first
proposed, a modified version would be required. The Act should
be modified to restrict the amount of buy back rather than prohibit
buy back. This might meet less resistance, but it would still allow
for control of the quantity of drugs that the wholesalers buy back.
Moreover, the Protecting Patients and Hospitals From Price
Gouging Act should be passed to address the wholesalers and the
gray market companies that are involved in gray market
activities.193 This act also addressed the stage of the gray market
that involved the leakage of the chain.194 This is when the price of
drugs keeps getting multiplied. After a wholesaler sells to another
wholesaler, or other entity, the price keeps increasing, forcing the
last entity to make the price extremely high in order to make a
profit for the business to stay afloat. To address this, the Act
would have made it illegal for wholesalers to price gouge
prescription drugs during a time of shortage. This Note proposes
that all of the aspects of this law be applied to the gray market
companies that price gouge in addition to the wholesalers.
Wholesale distributors would be held accountable if they charged
“unreasonably excessive” prices for short supply drugs.195 The
accountability that the distributors would be subjected to could
include imprisonment up to 3 years or fines of $500,000, or a
combination of both.196 This proposal suggests that this fine be
increased to $800,000 per serious violation. This Act incentivizes
companies, wholesalers, and distributors to not participate in the
gray market because if caught, they would pay fines and company

190 Gray Market Drug Reform and Transparency of 2012, H.R. 5853, 112th Cong.

(2012).

191 See id.
192 Id.
193 Protecting Patients and Hospitals from Price Gouging Act, S. 3622, 112th Cong.

(2012).

194 See id.
195 Id. § 4.
196 Id. § 5.
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executives could face time in prison. The Act would deter those
entities willing to engage in these faulty practices of price gouging.
These new laws or single law should also have additional
provisions that directly attack the gray market and gray market
companies that are participating in price gouging. The Federal
Government needs to prevent the monopoly from happening on
these “medically necessary” drugs before the companies can even
have exposure to them. There needs to be added provisions to the
above acts that prevent the sale of these life-saving drugs in bulk
to specific entities. The new provision can set a maximum number
of drugs that one company can buy from a wholesaler or
distributor and a restriction on how much a company can hold of
a particular life-saving drug. This can be difficult, especially if a
limited amount of companies sell a certain type of drug. However,
if there is at least some regulation regarding the amount of a
particular drug that a company can hold onto at a given time, it
could prevent a company that resells the drug from having a
complete monopoly on a specific drug. Although this can also have
a negative effect by perhaps deterring manufacturers from
producing large quantities of drugs, the right amount of drug
production can be part of a solution. All of these laws should be
combined into one law or all passed at the same time with the
additional provisions above.
Additionally, a committee should be made solely for the purpose
of regulating gray market activities and pharmaceutical price
gouging. Multiple committees are being appointed the task of
trying to solve a price gouging or pharmaceutical drug problem.
There is no streamlined focus that one committee is giving to the
issue of the gray market alone. Creating a committee that is solely
focused on the gray market will make the workload manageable
and increase the man power for the specific issue. This committee
can be part of the FDA: the newly created committee can be a
subcommittee with its own tasks but will also report to the FDA
and its overarching regulations. The committee should include
people that are knowledgeable in the field and are also qualified
government officials that know the process of enforcing
regulations.
Arguably, some committees cannot keep up with the work they
are supposed to address because of lack of resources. To make sure
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the above proposed legislation is enforceable, a new committee will
ensure the attention that this social injustice deserves.
VI.  CONCLUSION
In order to shut down the gray market, multiple issues need to
be addressed. The gray market is not a single problem that can be
fixed with one step. The gray market and its effects on price
gouging of life-saving drugs is just one part of what seems to be a
domino effect. The national drug crisis leads to an environment
where a gray market can exist, making entities able to take
advantage of other entities and patients in the effort of making a
profit. From here, price gouging becomes the last inevitable step
along the domino effect making the gray market a connecting
domino piece between the national drug crisis and price gouging
of lifesaving pharmaceutical drugs. The national drug crisis is a
cause of the gray market while price gouging is a direct result of
the gray market; it is an endless cycle. To break this endless cycle,
it needs to be addressed at all angles, at the same time. The
national drug crisis is most likely the hardest issue to address.
Drug shortages will persist due to uncontrollable causes, such as
limited raw materials. However, shutting down the gray market
will shut down a major price gouging mechanism used to take
advantage of dispensing entities.
Although this Note addresses a serious issue in the
pharmaceutical industry that most of society would support,
lobbyists in support of the price gouging companies and the price
gouging companies themselves would not support regulating the
gray market. Companies are making profits off of drugs that used
to be unprofitable, and there are lobbyists that are supportive of
these companies. However, with recent news creating public
awareness of this issue, the support in fixing the problem can
overcome its opponents. Proponents of regulating the gray market
will bring enough support to want to create a solid solution.
Ultimately, direct federal legislation can be the start of seeing
the gray market diminish. Some proposed legislation should be
passed with the additional provisions that will fill unanswered
gaps. A separate committee for the gray market would be helpful
in taking on such a daunting task. However, this social injustice
has lasted way too long, and it affects a big sector of the United

RENDE - MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

2/6/19 4:25 PM

REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE GOUGING

405

States population. The issue of price gouging medications needs
to be resolved in a direct and meaningful way: by shutting down
the gray market.

